SYMPOSIUM
Preface
My first experience with a law review symposium such as
this one was at the University of North Carolina in the mid1970s. Under a grant from the Carter Administration we commissioned a series of articles around a similar theme-hospital
cost containment-that were eventually published in 1980.1
The articles reflected what was then the dominant version of
health care policy: that current efforts to contain costs were
the forerunners of a more elaborate and centralized system of
public regulatory controls. Thus, several authors examined the
legal problems that would be encountered under a scheme of
expanded government control over resource allocation;
another critiqued existing mechanisms to integrate consumer
involvement in regulatory decisionmaking; and another analyzed the difficulty of administering efforts to police the quality of services in tandem with government programs that are
primarily oriented towards cost reduction and budget control.
But each of the articles, mirroring much of the academic and
political debate of that time, adopted the underlying assumption that the future of cost containment would be built around
government, and primarily federal government, regulatory
strategies. Indeed, the purpose of the original grant from the
Carter Administration was to provide some of the legal foundation for the federal hospital rate setting program, Carter's
"9% Solution." That program had been proposed by the
Administration as the interim holding action in anticipation of
the more comprehensive cost controls that would be made part
of the nationalized health financing scheme that Carter had
envisioned as the centerpiece of his national health policy.
Even before that symposium was published, the Carter
strategy had proven to be highly unpopular, thus making those
articles auspiciously out-of-date. The proposal for a federal
1. HEALTH FACILITY REGULATION: THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
SYMPoSIUM (K. Wing ed. 1980); reprintedfrom 57 N.C. L. REV. 1160-1479 (1979).
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hospital rate setting scheme was soundly rejected by Congress.
Anticipating the same fate, Carter's promise of national health
insurance was quietly forgotten. The same political and academic debates that had so recently assumed government regulation as a foregone conclusion were suddenly giving
considerable attention to a virtually antithetical vision of the
future of health policy. Clark Havighurst, Alan Enthoveen,
and other "neoconservative" theorists were arguing that government regulation was not the answer to health care cost containment but rather part of the problem. Government's role
should not be to mandate cost containment resource allocation
decisions but instead to promote private and decentralized
decisionmaking by providers and insurers, and ultimately by
private consumers of their services. What was needed in
American health policy was a healthy dose of competition.
Ronald Reagan, of course, embraced this alternative vision
as his answer to rising health care costs and, in fact, in the first
few years of his Administration, managed to implement at
least some of its dictates. Federally mandated health planning
programs and many other indicia of federal health policy leadership were dismantled. Efforts were made to reduce federal
spending for and, consequently, federal direction over Medicaid and other state-administered health financing programs.
Some efforts were made to restructure Medicare according to
neoconservative principles; much was made of experiments to
encourage Medicare recipients to enroll in health maintenance
organizations and other capitation schemes; and when attempts
to repeal the Medicare peer review program failed, the program was recast with a somewhat more conservative patina. In
the private sector, the federal government actively encouraged
third party payers to develop and market alternative insurance
arrangements, to integrate financing and service delivery
schemes, and the like. But this was done in the name of privatization and competition, not in response to federal subsidy and
mandate. At the same time hospitals, physicians, and other
providers were advised that their future lay not in their commitment to the social good, but rather in their pursuit of economic
self-interest.
Profit
maximization,
proprietary
strategies, and price competition, terms that were once
anathematic to health care policy, were suddenly de rigeur in
an environment described more often as "the market place"
than as the "health care system." The states were urged to fol-
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low the federal lead and to remove the regulatory barriers to
these competitively-based reforms.
The major health policy reforms of the 1980s, the adoption
of prospective payment of Medicare hospitals based on diagnosis rather than per diem costs, and the later development of a
"relative value scale" reimbursement scheme for Medicare
physicians, are harder to characterize. In one respect, these
reforms moved Medicare reimbursement policy closer to a
price-based scheme, rather than its traditional cost-based
scheme. This was in keeping with the neoconservative strategy
of making government a "smart consumer" rather than a
bureaucratic regulator. In other respects, and as providers
have frequently bemoaned, the PPS-DRG and RVS schemes
and the resulting influence on provider behavior and autonomy certainly must "feel" like more government regulation
in fact even if they represent more competition in theory.
More to the point, through the mid-1980s, the Congress and, to
a certain extent, the Administration cooled to the full dictates
of the neoconservative agenda. Most notably, the linchpin of
the competitive strategy, the removal of the government subsidy for employer-based insurance, was occasionally discussed
but never seriously considered. Major competitively designed
reforms of Medicaid and Medicare, such as voucher-based
schemes and fixed lids on government spending, were also
eschewed. The reaction at the state level was similar. Many
states jumped at the opportunity to deregulate health care and
unleash market forces for ideological reasons or for more basic
political reasons. Other states were reluctant to dismantle
their certificate of need program and other regulatory programs. A few states, in fact, attempted to fill the vacuum of
federal leadership and pursue even more comprehensive regulatory controls.
There are a number of ways in which this chapter in the
quixotic politics of health policy can be characterized and,
more importantly, evaluated. Have we now witnessed the
healthy dose of competition that neoconservative theorists
originally urged and, if so, what have been the results? Or did
our reluctance to abandon entirely direct government controls
and the regulatory strategy of the 1970s leave us with only half
a loaf of competition and deny us the full benefits that the
market strategy might have ultimately provided? Is it timely
to correct our course with a return to some of the regulatory
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measures of the 1970s or even to more rigorous government
control? If the Medicare reimbursement reforms are in fact
the most significant health policy reforms of the 1980s-and I
think there is little doubt that they were-what does that tell
us about our willingness to cede health policy decisions to the
private sector and to the dictates of competition? More to the
point, given this recent history, where can we go from here in
the 1990s and where should we go?
I think the answers to these questions have less to do with
the theoretical debate of competition per se versus regulation
per se, or even with the related arguments over the proper
characterization of the programs of the past decade as properly
"regulatory" or "competitive," than with the practical results
of these programs. What we need to know about PPS/DRG
reimbursement is not whether it is correctly described as a
price mechanism or best regarded as one form of "command
and control" rate setting, but rather what it has achieved and
what prospects for success it holds for the future. What we
need to evaluate are the existing cost containment measures in
both the private and public sectors, whatever their theoretical
origins, to determine what has worked and what has not and
what that tells us for the next increment of change or reform.
What we hope we have done in this symposium is to further the inquiry into these questions and the development of
their answers. We have asked each of our authors to consider
some aspect of hospital cost containment, to assess its significance, and to evaluate the related legal and political problems
that will be encountered as health policy develops in the 1990s.
Bruce Vladeck's review of the experience with PPS/DRG
reimbursement focuses on some important lessons for the
development of that reimbursement scheme, but, more importantly, for the development of federal health policy generally.
Tim Jost's review of the recent experience with the Peer
Review Organization program examines many of these same
lessons, but also the specific legal and administrative difficulties that arise in the PRO cost containment and enforcement
program.
Marvis Oehm's paper reviews the experience of cost containment efforts similar to those of the publicly sponsored
PROs, but in the private utilization review programs that have
developed in the last decade of enhanced competition.
John Blum's paper moves from the macro level to the
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micro; he examines the prospects-as well as the problemsthat will be encountered as individual hospitals attempt to
respond to both private and public utilization and cost containment programs by conditioning staff privileges for economic
reasons.
Bruce Siegel reviews the experience of the State of New
Jersey, one state that continues to pursue a regulatory-based
strategy and that has attempted perhaps the most comprehensive government-mandated controls over health care in the
nation.
Our final paper, written by Jim Simpson, shifts the focus
back to the individual institution and reviews the underlying
assumptions that have led public policy to consider hospitals as
charitable and nonprofit and questions whether that assumption should not be revised given the contemporary environment within which hospitals must operate.
The UPS Law Review, faculty, and all of us who have
been involved in organizing this symposium are very grateful
for the efforts of these authors and hope that these papers will
be given the attention that they deserve.
Kenneth R. Wing, Professorof Law
University of Puget Sound School of Law

